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The Human Right to a Fair Start in Life 
 




This article tackles a reemerging debate between trial courts 
and just about everyone else: can a judge condition an offender’s 
early release or probation on successfully avoiding future 
pregnancy? Wading into such controversial territory has its risks, 
as Tennessee Judge Sam Benningfield discovered in 2017 when he 
conditioned inmates’ early release on their having vasectomies or 
long-term birth control implants.  The order generated outrage 
across the political spectrum, earning Benningfield a formal 
reprimand from the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct and even 
sparking a bill that would specifically prohibit any similar future 
quid pro quo. 
While the backlash to Judge Benningfield’s order in particular 
is well deserved, his critics also reject wholesale the notion that 
courts could ever be justified in conditioning probation or early 
release on avoiding conception. This article stakes out new territory 
in the debate, arguing that such orders may protect a child’s right 
to a fair start in life without violating parents’ constitutional rights 
nor their human right to found a family if (1) the offender may 
choose the particular birth control method and (2) the orders only 
apply to severe child abuse or neglect offenders during a limited 
rehabilitative period. 
Grounded in the foundational principle that parents known to 
abuse and neglect children should not have more absent 
rehabilitation, and cognizant of structural inequities of race, class, 
gender, and national origin, the article presents a model “Fair 
Start” order that may be implemented in courts across the country. 
  
                                                                                                             
* J.D. UC Berkley School of Law (2014). 
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In May of 2017, Judge Sam Benningfield offered inmates in 
White County, Tennessee, an unusual quid pro quo: 30 days’ credit 
toward jail time for agreeing to a vasectomy or a contraceptive 
implant. The judge’s proposition sparked public outcry as well as 
several civil rights lawsuits on behalf of jailed inmates, and by 
November the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct had formally 
reprimanded Benningfield and eliminated the program. The 
Tennessee state legislature soon followed with a bill to prohibit any 
similar trading of birth control for early release. 
That Judge Benningfield’s order was fatally flawed is clear, 
being overbroad in its application, as well as unnecessarily 
prescriptive by requiring that inmates submit themselves to a 
particular medical procedure. However, critics dismiss not just 
Benningfield’s own ill-conceived attempt at “preventing the birth of 
substance addicted babies,” but also reject wholesale the notion that 
courts could ever be justified in issuing orders that condition 
probation or early release on avoiding conception. This article 
contends that such outright dismissal is unfounded, occurring within 
a pronatalist family planning framework that fails to acknowledge 
(1) the irrevocable, lifelong harm inflicted upon children born to 
abusive or negligent parents, (2) that the public child welfare system 
is frequently no better, (3) that the parents themselves benefit from 
avoiding pregnancy, having more time and resources to dedicate 
toward rehabilitation. 
This article further argues that “Fair Start Orders”—if modified 
to simply proscribe conception (so that the offender chooses the 
particular birth control method) and narrowly tailored to apply only 
to serious child abuse or neglect offenders during a limited 
rehabilitative period—may best protect a child’s right to a fair start 
in life without violating parents’ constitutional rights nor their 
human right to found a family. 
 
II. THE GLARING NEED FOR FAIR START ORDERS 
TO PREVENT ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF FUTURE 
CHILDREN 
 
In 2016, child protective services agencies (CPS) received an 
estimated 4.1 million referrals for abuse and neglect involving 
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approximately 7.4 million children in the United States.1 National 
statistics, despite underreporting, 2  estimate that 1,670 to 1740 
children die from parental or caregiver abuse and neglect in the U.S. 
annually.3  In 77.6% of child abuse and neglect cases, the parents 
are themselves the perpetrators.4 
In cases where the child survives severe abuse or neglect, CPS 
may remove the victim (and, under certain circumstances, their 
siblings5) from the abuser’s custody. However, abusive parents have 
carte blanche to conceive additional children, and those additional 
children are also likely to suffer severe abuse and neglect, be it in 
the home or upon removal to the public child welfare system. 
 
A. SEVERE CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT RECIDIVISM RATES 
ARE HIGH, BOTH DURING REHABILITATION AND 
AFTERWARD 
 
In keeping with the national policy of family preservation, 
substantial public resources have been dedicated to treatment 
services for child abuse and neglect offenders so that they may retain 
or regain custody of their children.6 Nonetheless, the success of 
these rehabilitative programs has been mixed at best, with studies 
finding that more than one-third of offenders maltreated their 
children during the treatment period; and over one-half of the 
offenders were judged likely to mistreat their children following 
                                                                                                             
1Child Maltreatment 2016: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse 
and Neglect Data System, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Children’s 
Bureau. 
2Schnitzer, P. et al, Advancing public health surveillance to estimate child 
maltreatment fatalities: Review and recommendations, Child Welfare, 92(2), 
77–98 (2013). 
3Children and conflict in a changing world: Machel study 10-year strategic 
review. New York: UNICEF (2009). 
4Child Maltreatment, supra note 1. 
5See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Santos, 336 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972) 
(holding that there was sufficient evidence to terminate the parental custody 
rights for a baby boy given the significant amount of abuse his sister had 
suffered even though he had not personally suffered abuse); see also In re 
Interest of M.B., 480 N.W.2d 160, 161-62 (Neb. 1992) (“If evidence of the fault 
or habits of a parent or custodian indicates a risk of harm to a child, the juvenile 
court may properly take jurisdiction of that child, even though the child has not 
yet been harmed or abused.”). 
6Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating A Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective 
Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60  
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completion of the program. 7  Worse yet, the more severe the 
previous abuse or neglect, the more likely parents were to re-abuse.8 
 
B. CONCEPTION OF ADDITIONAL CHILDREN ITSELF INCREASES 
RISK OF RECIDIVISM AND INTERFERES WITH 
REHABILITATION 
 
 With recidivism rates already high, social science data 
indicates that subsequent pregnancies further increase the risk of 
child abuse or neglect. 9  Courts, too, have acknowledged the 
likelihood that the conception of additional children exacerbates 
already abusive or negligent environments. 10  As a matter of 
common sense, a parent convicted of severe neglect or abuse is 
better equipped to focus on rehabilitation when he or she does not 
have an additional infant to care for. 
                                                                                                             
7Anne H. Cohn & Deborah Daro, Is Treatment Too Late? What Ten Years of 
Evaluative Research Tells Us,11 Child Abuse & Neglect 433 (1987); see also 
Frequency of Child Maltreatment Recurrences Among Families Known to CPS, 
3 Child Maltreatment 27 (1998), available at 
http://cmx.sagepub.com/content/3/1/27 (reviewing forty-five maltreatment 
recurrence studies and concluding that the rates for mid to high risk cases are 
high, ranging up to over 50%). 
8Berkely Planning Associates, Child Abuse And Neglect Treatment Programs: 
Final Report And Summary Of Findings From The Evaluation Of The Joint 
Ocd/Srs National Demonstration Program In Child Abuse And Neglect 1974-
1977. 
9See Lesa Bethea, M.D., Primary Prevention of Child Abuse, American Family 
Physician, March 15, 1999, available at http:// 
www.aafp.org/afp/990315ap/1577.html risk factors for child abuse include ‘lack 
of preparation for the extreme stress of having a new infant’ and ‘multiple 
young children ‘); Samer S. El-Kamary et. al., Hawaii’s Healthy Start Home 
Visiting Program: Determinants and Impact of Rapid Repeat Birth, Pediatrics, 
Vol. 114, No. 3, Sept. 2004, at e317, available at http:// 
pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/abstract/114/3/e317 (finding that 
families “already at risk for child maltreatment” mothers were likely to have 
‘severe maternal parenting stress,’ ‘neglectful behavior’ and ‘poor warmth’ 
toward the new child when having a child within 24 months of a previous birth); 
see also Richard L. Light, Abused and Neglected Children, 43 Harvard Educ. 
Rev. 556 (1973) (noting that children in larger families have an increased 
chance of being abused.) 
10See, e.g., V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *4 (‘[R]efraining from getting pregnant 
again at this time will help enable this respondent to get her difficult life under 
control so she can care adequately for her baby ....’); In re Appeal in Pima 
County Juvenile Dependency Action No. 96290, 785 P.2d 121, 124 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1990) (“[t]he [trial] Court believes these are young parents who have been 
overwhelmed by their rapidly expanding family and steadily diminishing 
resources. The mother has had a tremendously difficult load to bear as 
essentially the sole parent for the family because of the father’s alcoholism.”) 
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C. THE WAIT AND SEE APPROACH CAUSES PERMANENT HARM 
TO FUTURE CHILDREN 
 
It is not uncommon for CPS to wait until a child has been 
repeatedly abused before finally removing the child. In North 
Carolina, for example, an investigation found that more than 120 
children died in the state within a year of their parents or caregivers 
being referred to a state agency; more than 30 of the children were 
killed by being beaten to death, shot, drowned, smothered, or 
poisoned by drugs. 11  In Florida, between 2008 and 2014, 447 
children died of abuse or neglect after their families had come to the 
attention of Florida’s Department of Children and Families 12 
In those cases where the child survives the abuse, the delayed 
intervention by CPS nonetheless causes irreparable harm: indeed, 
even a single instance of child abuse can have long lasting effects, 
including neurological dysfunction, learning and intelligence 
deficiencies, poor language skills, and maladjustment to school.13 
Moreover, one study found that 80% of young adults abused as 
children met the criteria for at least one psychological disorder, and 
about 30% of abused and neglected children will later abuse their 
own children.14 
And yet, the state’s reluctance to remove children from their 
abusers is not without some justification since (1) the removals 
themselves are traumatic (even for children with abusive or 
negligent parents),15 and (2) abuse and neglect is widespread in the 
state system as well.16 The recent opioid crisis in the U.S. has only 
accelerated the problem: foster care cases involving drug-using 
parents have hit the highest point in more than three decades of 
                                                                                                             
11Greg Barnes, Observer Investigation: Deaths point to crisis in NC’s child 
welfare system, Fayetteville Observer (Sept. 23, 2017), available at 
http://www.fayobserver.com/news/20170923/observer-investigation-deaths-
point-to-crisis-in-ncs-child-welfare-system. 
12Innocents Lost: A Miami Herald I-Team Investigation, Miami Herald (Mar. 16 
2014), http:// media.miamiherald.com/static/media/projects/2014/innocents-
lost/, archived at http://perma.cc/GU2S-LAK8 
13Harold P. Martin & Patricia Beezley, Behavioral Observations Of Abused 
Children, In Child Abuse: Commission And Omission, supra note 1, at 436-38 
(discussing characteristics of abused children). 
14See Child Help, National Child Abuse Statistics (2009). http:// 
www.childhelp.org/resources/learning-center/statistics#. 
15Catherine R. Lawrence et al.,The Impact of Foster Care on Development, 18 
Development and Psychopathology 57, 58 (2006). 
16Children’s Advocacy Inst. & First Star, Shame on U.S.: Failings by All Three 
Branches of Our Federal Government Leave Abused and Neglected Children 
Vulnerable to Further Harm 29 (2015). 
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record-keeping, accounting for 92,000 children entering an already 
overburdened system in 2016.17 
It is evident then, that once a child is born to abusive parents, 
CPS’s role is largely one of determining which is the lesser of what 
are undeniable evils: parental abuse, traumatic removal, and a 
likelihood of abuse in state custody. It behooves us therefore, in 
instances where the parent has already committed severe child 
abuse, to intervene before an additional child is born. This Article 
will argue for intervention in the form of a “Fair Start” order, 
whereby courts may condition probation on avoiding conception 
during a rehabilitative period in order to best protect a child’s right 
to Fair Start in life. 
  
III. THE FAIREST OF THEM ALL: TOWARD A 
MODEL FAIR START ORDER 
 
While Tennessee Judge Benningfield’s intentions may or may 
not have been noble when he offered inmates early release in 
exchange for their having a vasectomy or contraception implant—
having hoped to “prevent[] the birth of substance addicted babies”—
the glaring legal inadequacies of his order lent credence to the notion 
that judicial intervention along these lines is “backward” and 
“archaic” and “Neanderthal.”18 First, Benningfield’s proposal was 
overly broad, being applied to all inmates rather than narrowly 
tailored so as to apply only to those with convictions for “severe 
child abuse and neglect.”19  Second, Benningfield proscribed the 
                                                                                                             
17Number of children in foster care continues to increase, U.S. Dept. of Health 
and Human Services, (Nov. 30, 2017), available at 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/media/press/2017/number-of-children-in-foster-care-
continues-to-increase; see also Sharon Balmer, From Poverty to Abuse and Back 
Again: The Failure of the Legal and Social Services Communities to Protect 
Foster Children, 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 935, 939 (2005) (noting that the foster 
care system in this country amounts to what one court called a “lost generation 
of children whose tragic plight is being repeated every day.” (quoting LaShawn 
A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
18Joe Patrice, Prison Snips Sentences If Inmates Snip… (Yes, We’re Talking 
About Vasectomies), Above the Law (July 20, 2017), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/prison-snips-sentences-if-inmates-snip-yes-
were-talking-about-vasectomies/. 
19See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(22) (“Severe child abuse” means: 
(A)(i) The knowing exposure of a child to or the knowing failure to protect a 
child from abuse or neglect that is likely to cause serious bodily injury or death 
and the knowing use of force on a child that is likely to cause serious bodily 
injury or death; 
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particular method of birth control in the form of a vasectomy or 
long-term contraception implant, when the same result could 
theoretically be achieved through less invasive measures such as 
condoms, birth control pills, or abstinence, all of which are less 
likely to harken back to sterilization’s sinister, racist history.20 
Just months after Benningfield’s order, on February 8, 2018, a 
federal judge in Oklahoma issued a shorter sentence to a defendant 
as “the benefit of her decision to be sterilized.” 21  While the 
sterilization “decision” may have been her own, it was decidedly not 
her idea: the judge had advised that defendant that at her upcoming 
sentencing hearing for passing a counterfeit check “she may, if (and 
only if) she chooses to do so, present medical evidence to the court 
establishing that she has been rendered incapable of procreation” 
Yet this judge did not receive the same public backlash and 
professional criticism that Judge Bennington did,22 perhaps in part 
because his order targeted a defendant who had already relinquished 
parental rights to six of her seven children after an Oklahoma 
Department of Human Services investigation found she had 
“fail[ed] to protect the children from harm” and had used cocaine 
and methamphetamine during much of that time.23 
                                                                                                             
(ii) “Serious bodily injury” shall have the same meaning given in § 39-15-
402(d). 
(B) Specific brutality, abuse or neglect towards a child that in the opinion of 
qualified experts has caused or will reasonably be expected to produce severe 
psychosis, severe neurotic disorder, severe depression, severe developmental 
delay or intellectual disability, or severe impairment of the child’s ability to 
function adequately in the child’s environment, and the knowing failure to 
protect a child from such conduct”). 
20See In re Bobbijean P., 2 Misc. 3d 1011(A), 784 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Fam. Ct. 
2004), adhered to, 6 Misc. 3d 1012(A), 800 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Fam. Ct. 2005), 
and order vacated in part, 46 A.D.3d 12, 842 N.Y.S.2d 826 (2007) (“It is 
important to note that the court is not directing what steps the mother should 
take in order to not get pregnant, or what steps the father should take in order 
to not get any woman pregnant. Practices are available to avoid or prevent 
pregnancies consistent with personal and even religious beliefs. There are a 
great variety of birth control methods available.”) 
21Findings At Sentencing at 5, United States v. Creel, CR-16-189-002-F. 
22The lack of backlash may be attribute in part to Friot’s status as a federal, 
rather than state, judge, since federal judges are not directly beholden to voters, 
being appointed rather than elected. 
23Id. at 3-4. (Still, there were problems with Judge Friot’s order, including his 
gratuitous reference to the defendant’s children being “out of wedlock” and the 
somewhat cavalier tone he adopted in challenging the government’s contention 
that consider[ing] Creel’s voluntary sterilization procedure in determining a 
sentence” might violated her fundamental constitutional right to procreate, 
retorting, ““the Supreme Court has yet to recognize a constitutional right to 
bring crack or methamphetamine addicted babies into this world.” Judge Friot 
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Indeed, a plurality of courts have found a compelling state 
interest sufficient to overcome even strict scrutiny when the 
defendant has exhibited a pattern of repeatedly neglecting or 
abusing his or her existing children, assuming the order is applied 
for a limited rehabilitative period. 24 
In a landmark case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin approved 
as constitutional a court order preventing a recidivist defendant from 
having children until he was able to care for them.25 Similarly, in 
State v. Kline, an Oregon appellate court held that a drug-using and 
physically abusive father could be prohibited from conceiving a 
third child until he had completed drug-treatment, anger 
management and counseling programs, and had received the court’s 
written approval lifting the no-conception ban.26 
New York’s highest court has gone so far as to note that 
“parental ‘rights’ are not so much ‘rights’, but responsibilities....” a 
principle that a subsequent court relied upon in concluding that “a 
parent has the responsibility to rear his or her children, but not an 
unlimited right to bear children irresponsibly.”27 And in California, 
legislative authorization of procreative restrictions as conditions of 







                                                                                                             
also failed to describe in detail the facts involved in defendant’s failure to 
protect six of her children from harm—this kind of order requires a detailed 
factual records as justification). 
24Whether or not strict scrutiny would actually be applied remains an open 
question, since “the sweeping references to the procreative right in modern 
substantive due process cases are dicta….” Carter Dillard, Child Welfare and 
Future Persons, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 367, 416 (2009); see also I. Glenn Cohen, The 
Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1135, 1141 
(2008) (“American constitutional jurisprudence appears to treat the right to be 
and not to be a gestational parent (still in the non-interference sense) as 
conjoined. But this bundling is not inherent.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1149-50 
(“Griswold thus emphasized the invasion of the marital ‘space,’ not the 
interference with procreative decisions per se as the harm . . . .”) 
25State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 74 
(2002). 
26963 P.2d 697, 699 (1998). 
27In re V.R., 6 Misc. 3d 1003(A) (Fam. Ct. 2004) (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 
N.Y.2d 543 (1976)). 
288 Cal. App. 4th 362, 374, 10 Cal. (1992). 
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A. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR A MODEL FAIR START ORDER 
 
i. Orders should be rehabilitative rather than punitive 
 
“Termination statutes by their very nature, are prospective and 
predictive . . . . Their purpose is not to punish parents for past 
behavior, but rather to prevent future harm to children by 
interpreting past behavior as indicative of future parental 
unfitness.”29 Fair Start orders should operate the same way, and this 
can be achieved by requiring completion of rehabilitative treatment 
in conjunction with the procreative restriction. Some commentators 
seem to presume that Fair Start orders and rehabilitative treatment 
are somehow mutually exclusive.30 On the contrary, as previously 
discussed, the procreative restrictions themselves help facilitate 
rehabilitation by allowing the offender to focus time and energy on 
treatment rather than care for a new child. 
 
ii. Orders should be issued in cases of “severe child abuse,”31 
preferably as a replacement for “no custody” orders 
 
Recognizing that “requir[ing] [a] child to suffer the fate of his 
[severely abused] siblings prior to termination of parental rights 
would be a tragic misapplication of the law”32; that “to wait until 
injury to decide issue of health and development of child makes no 
sense,”33 ; that “require[ing] a child to suffer abuse in those cases 
where mistreatment is virtually assured is illogical and directly 
averse to society’s fundamental policy of preserving the welfare of 
                                                                                                             
29Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic 
Violence on Children Through Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 
Calif. L. Rev. 757, 786 (1996) 
30See Steven M. Berezney, Zablocki Reborn?: The Constitutionality of 
Probation Conditions Prohibiting Deadbeat and Abusive Fathers from 
Conceiving Children, 5 J. L. Society 255, 309–10 (2003) (“Abusive fathers like 
Kline should also be rehabilitated instead of prohibited from procreating. A 
procreation ban for several years will not cure anger management problems. In 
cases like Kline, courts should first condition probation on successful 
completion of several anger management and other related courses in hopes of 
rehabilitation. Until abusive fathers get their emotions and anger under control, 
they will continue to beat their wives and children long after their 
probation expires.”). 
31Supra note 19, defining “severe child abuse” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-
102(22). 
32In re Interest of J.A.J. (Mo.App.1983), 652 S.W.2d 745, 749. 
33New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. A.W. (1986), 103 N.J. 591, 616, 
512 A. 2d 438, 451, at fn. 14. 
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its youth,” 34 ; courts have upheld termination of parental rights 
before a particular child has suffered any specific injury on the basis 
that the harm caused to his or her sibling evinces a substantial risk 
that he or she will suffer a similar fate.35 
Several states go a step further, allowing for the termination of 
parental rights at birth because the parents’ severe neglect and abuse 
of previous children was sufficient to demonstrate a “substantial risk 
of harm” to the infant.36 In California, for example, if a parent causes 
the death of a child through abuse or neglect, they are presumed unfit 
as to all future children, making a child’s removal at birth via “no 
custody” order highly likely, and all but guaranteed if the offender 
has an additional child before he or she has time to be rehabilitated.37 
While the same logic that supports “no custody” orders would 
seem to support “fair start” orders as well, courts have held that 
probation orders prohibiting procreation are not “reasonably related 
to future criminality” because they are in fact redundant with “no 
custody” orders.38 Such reasoning is fundamentally flawed since (1) 
it incorrectly assumes that children are not harmed by having been 
raised in the public system, in direct conflict with the state policy’s 
                                                                                                             
34Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 569 (Fla. 1991). 
35See generally, Karen S. Kassebaum, The Siblings of Abused Children: Must 
They Suffer Harm Before Removal from the Home?, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 1547 
(1996). 
36See, e.g., In re N.H., 889 A.2d 727, 727 (Vt. 2005) (discussing family court 
order permitting removal of newborn from mother whose parental rights with 
respect to four previous children had been terminated by courts in three different 
states); In re K.C.H., 316 Mont. 13, 17 (2003) (rejecting argument that actual, 
not prospective, abuse or neglect is required for a child to be deemed a “Youth 
in Need of Care,” buttressed by the statutory language providing that a 
“substantial risk of harm to a child’s health or welfare” constitutes child abuse). 
37Adrienne McKay, Termination of Parental Rights in California: Why A 
Temporary Prohibition on Conception Would Have Better Served Ethan N., 35 
Sw. U. L. Rev. 61, 72 (2005). 
38See, e.g., Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919–20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) 
(“[A]lthough this condition of probation could reasonably relate to future 
criminality-i.e., child abuse-it could do so only if appellant had custody of the 
child or was permitted to have contact with the child. In this case, however, 
those possibilities have already been foreclosed….by the other valid conditions 
of probation.”); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979)(“[W]e hold that the condition prohibiting custody of children has a clear 
relationship to the crime of child abuse and is therefore valid. The conditions 
relating to marriage and pregnancy have no relationship to the crime of child 
abuse, and relate to noncriminal conduct. Possibly these conditions could relate 
to future criminality, if the marriage or pregnancy resulted in custody of minor 
children who could be abused. But we hold that the conditions are not 
reasonably related to future criminality, since such custody of minor children is 
already prohibited by the valid condition directly addressed to custody”). 
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in favor of maintaining the family unit; (2) fails to account for the 
resulting burden on the already struggling public welfare system (as 
well as the taxpayer)39; and (3) fails to prevent pre-birth harms to 
future children in the case of substance-abusing mothers or abuse 
fathers who commit violence against pregnant mothers. 
Furthermore, scholars have argued that the removal of newborn 
infants from parents is far more intrusive than temporarily 
prohibiting would-be parents from procreating.40 
One way to get around courts’ flawed reasoning is through 
legislative authorization of Fair Start orders, since doing so changes 
the test applied in determining the validity of the probationary 
conditions. In Florida, for example, in enacting a statutory 
authorization of Fair Start orders would transform them from 
“special conditions” of probation to “general condition”; “general 
conditions” need only to be “rationally related to the State’s need to 
supervise the defendant regardless of whether the condition is 
reasonably related to the defendant’s offense….”41 
 
iii. Legislative authorization of Fair Start orders should explicitly 
account for the principles of affirmative action, and structural 
inequities of race, class, and gender.42 
 
One the one hand, there is good reason to be wary of any policy 
that contemplates limitations on procreative rights, given the racist, 
sexist, and classist history of state efforts to limit procreation 
through eugenics programs and other population control efforts.43 
On other hand, “[t]he past application of morally reprehensible 
policies designed to restrict reproduction does not entail the 
wrongness of any and all attempts to regulate procreative behavior, 
                                                                                                             
39Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Child Abuse and 
Neglect Cost the United States $124 Billion (Feb. 1, 2012). 
www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2012/p0201_child_abuse.html. 
40Joan Callahan, Contraception or Incarceration: What’s Wrong with This 
Picture?, 7 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 67, 75 (1996); Joseph R. Tybor, Does 
Sterilization Fit the Crime? Woman Must Decide, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 1988, 
at 4C (quoting law professor Daniel Polsby): “The state takes kids away from 
unfit parents all the time. What is proposed here is not  the taking away 
of children that actually exist, but those who don’t exist and, arguably,  that’s 
less invasive than removing a natural child from its parents.” 
41Brock v. State, 688 So. 2d 909, 911–12 (Fla. 1997). 
42See Section III infra, for discussion of Fair Start Orders and gender. 
43Kendra Huard Fershee, The Parent Trap: The Unconstitutional Practice of 
Severing Parental Rights Without Due Process of Law, 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 
639, 651 (2014). 
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especially behavior that constitutes flagrant disregard for the welfare 
of offspring.”44 
It should go without saying that institutional racism, classism, 
and sexism are far from being relics of the past. For starters, the 
broader criminal justice system consistently favors the white and the 
wealthy.45 Additionally, the child welfare system itself has been 
criticized for persistent racial and class bias.46 One study found that 
that child abuse was less likely to be recognized in white children 
from two parent families than children from Black and single-parent 
families.47 Scholar Dorothy Roberts concluded that prosecutions of 
drug-addicted pregnant Black women “are better understood as a 
way of punishing Black women for having babies rather than as a 
way of protecting Black fetuses.”48 
Nonetheless, recognizing the glaring flaws of the existing 
system cannot justify throwing up our hands and allowing the most 
vulnerable among us to be abused and neglecte. As family law 
scholar Naomi Cahn notes: 
The racism and sexism of the criminal justice system, however, 
do not mean that children are not getting hurt— children are being 
                                                                                                             
44See Pearson, supra at fn. 8. 
45See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System 
Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 261, 267-72 (2007); Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: 
Toward A Color-Conscious Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1541, 1549 (2012); Dan M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of 
Megan’s Law, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1535 (2004). 
46Susan Brooks & Dorothy Roberts, Family Court Reform, 40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 
453, 453 (2002); Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced 
Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973-2005: Implications 
for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
L. 299, 299, 309-10 (2013) (noting that because of poor women’s perceived 
failure to conform to traditional expectations of motherhood, they are subjected 
to heightened forms of scrutiny by medical staff and more often referred to law 
enforcement for investigation.); but see Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating A Child-
Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective Early Intervention to Prevent 
Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 Buff. L. Rev. 1323, 1327 
(2012) (noting studies that found that while “black children were, in fact, 
maltreated at much higher rates than white children, as would be expected given 
socioeconomic differences between black and white families and other 
established predictors for maltreatment…official reporting and removal rates 
closely tracked actual maltreatment rates, indicating that while there might be 
pockets of discrimination within the system operating in different racial 
directions, there was no overall pattern of discrimination”). 
47Carole Jenny, M.D. et al., Analysis of Missed Cases of Abusive Head Trauma, 
281 JAMA 621, 621 (Feb. 17, 1999). 
48Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the 
Meaning of Liberty (1997). 
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neglected, abused, and killed by their caretakers. Childhood, while 
the topic of elegiac moralizing, is nonetheless deprivilegizing 
because children simply cannot speak for themselves.49 
Indeed, child abuse and neglect prosecutions are unique from 
prosecutions for other criminal offenses, since, in the vast majority 
of cases where the offender is a person of color and/or a poor person, 
the victim is as well. Consider also the evolution of domestic 
violence policy over the last decades: many of the same racial and 
class biases affect the way in which domestic violence is prosecuted, 
with feminist scholars having identified how aggressive policing of 
domestic violence disproportionately affects people of color.50 And 
yet, “despite the drawbacks of excessive criminalization and 
separation, the feminist revolution of DV law has brought 
significant benefits to many women”51; the same is necessarily true 
of Fair Start orders and the potential benefits to future children saved 
from neglect and abuse. 
Short of abolishing the current criminal justice system 
entirely, 52  what is left is to navigate the current version to best 
protect the most vulnerable among us, and poor children of color in 
particular in manner that does not discriminate. In order to protect 
against class discrimination, legislative authorizations of Fair Start 
orders should include a poverty exemption in cases of neglect, 
53  which should in tern help to prevent orders being used as tools of 
                                                                                                             
49Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of 
Criminalization, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 817, 825 (2000) 
50Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, 
and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1047 (2000). 
51Claire Houston, What Ever Happened to the “Child Maltreatment 
Revolution”?, 19 Geo. J. Gender & L. 1, 40 (2017). 
52See Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of 
Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 261 
(2007). This article does not take a position one way or the other on the merits 
of total abolition, but it does presume that the current system will remain in 
operation for the foreseeable future. 
53A minority of states and the District of Columbia already include a poverty 
exemption in their definition of child abuse and neglect. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-
18-103(14)(A)(Ii); D.C. Code § 16-2301(9)(A)(Ii); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
39.01(30)(F); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2202(D)(1); La. Child. Code Ann. Art. 
603(18) (2014); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-C:3(Xix)(B) (2014); N.D. Cent. 
Code Ann. § 27-20-02(8)(A); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6304(A); Tex. Fam. 
Code Ann. § 261.001(4)(B)(Iii); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.020(16); W.Va. 
Code Ann. § 49-1-3(11)(A)(I); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.02(12g). 
For example, the District of Columbia’s statute for child abuse and neglect states 
that “[t] he term ‘negligent treatment’ or  ‘maltreatment’ means failure to 
provide [a child with] adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, which 
includes medical neglect, 
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racial oppression, since people of color make up a disproportionate 
number of the nation’s poor. Orders should also heed calls for 
“color-conscious” law enforcement and prosecution. 54 
Orders should leave the method of birth control to the 
discretion of the parent55 
 
B. A MODEL FAIR START ORDER 
 
 
MODEL ORDER ADDITIONAL CONDITION[S] OF 
[COMMUNITY CONTROL/PROBATION] 
 
Adults possess a presumptive right to conceive children. This 
right diminishes when one has borne one or more children and 
severely abused or neglected them. The right may be suspended 
temporarily to fulfill the state’s compelling interest in protecting 
future children, and to protect defendant’s interest in successful 
rehabilitation. Defendant’s criminal conviction for child 
maltreatment is clear evidence of unfitness to parent at this time. To 
release Defendant into the community now would risk creating a 
situation in which another child is in danger of similar maltreatment 
at Defendant’s hands. That risk is sufficient reason for the state to 
refuse Defendant’s request for [community control/probation]. 
Thus, this court operates within its proper discretion by granting 
Defendant’s request only conditionally, contingent upon 
Defendant’s acting to avoid that risk, as it might do with any other 
risk posed by a convicted criminal. 
As an additional condition of [community control/probation] 
this court hereby orders Defendant to avoid [impregnating a 
woman/becoming pregnant] during the duration of the [community 
control/probation] period. 
Violation of this order will result in [extension of the 
[community control/probation] period, and order requiring 
                                                                                                             
and the deprivation is not due to the lack of financial means of his or her parent, 
guardian, or other custodian.” See D.C. CODE § 16-2301(24). 
54See generally Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward A 
Color-Conscious Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
1541, 1541 (2012). 
55See supra, note 43. 
Plaintiff,  v.  Defendant.  Case No. _________________  Judge ________________  JUDGMENT ENTRY 
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community service, revocation of probation and additional actions 
by this court to ensure the Defendant’s rehabilitation, etc.] 
This order is reasonably related to Defendant’s offense, risk of 
future re-offense, and necessary rehabilitative efforts, which will 
require devoting substantial time to counseling and other services 
targeting Defendant’s demonstrated propensity for maltreating 
children. 
This order serves the State’s compelling interests in preventing 
harm to future children. Further, this order in no way requires or 
condones abortion in the event of a pregnancy during the course of 
the order’s applicability. 
This condition is effective upon service of a copy of this order 
upon Defendant. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
IV. FAIR START ORDERS AND FEMINISM 
 
Philosopher John Stuart Mill lamented a century and a half ago 
that “misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the 
part of parents from being recognized, and legal obligations from 
being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for the former 
always, and in many cases for the latter also.” 56 According to Mill, 
the state’s responsibility necessarily extended to prospective 
children as well because, “to bring a child into existence without a 
fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but 
instruction and training for its mind is a moral crime, both against 
the unfortunate offspring and against society.”57 
Given that studies continue to link child abuse to poor family 
planning, 58  as well as the egregious failure of our after-the-fact 
public child welfare systems, 59  Mill’s argument resonates even 
more strongly today. And yet, major organizations such as Amnesty 
                                                                                                             
56John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 103 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 
1978) (1859). 
 57Id. 
58Kai Guterman, Unintended pregnancy as a predictor of child maltreatment, 48 
Child abuse & neglect 160-169 (2015). 
59Children’s Advocacy Inst. & First Star, Shame on U.S.: Failings by All Three 
Branches of Our Federal Government Leave Abused and Neglected Children 
Vulnerable to Further Harm 29 (2015). 
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International,60 and the Center for Reproductive Rights,61 insist that 
procreative rights must always be absolute and unlimited, even 
when that unlimited right all but ensures that a child will be born to 
grossly negligent or abusive parents.62 
The refusal of otherwise progressive organizations and thinkers 
to even consider the interests of children may be traced to the 
conflation of the rights to have and not have children, which is itself 
a corollary of a conflation of the pronatalist status quo with 
feminism. Indeed, commitment to absolute procreative rights has 
become a “moral bulldozer” that invariably “crushes all competing 
interests,” even when those interests include a future child’s 
fundamental interest in avoiding severe abuse and neglect.63 
 
A. THE FEMINIST CASE FOR ISSUING FAIR START ORDERS TO 
BOTH MEN AND WOMEN 
 
“From a feminist perspective, unlimited procreative liberty 
risks treating children as property, distorts understanding of the 
family, and neglects moral concerns about how we reproduce.” 64 
That is, “to confuse procreative with non-procreative sexual 
interaction, and to assume that the same rules apply in both sorts of 
cases, is to ignore the obvious fact that procreation leads to the 
existence of a child whose interests must be considered and whose 
creation will have an impact on society.”65 
As a result of the conflation of the rights of nonprocreation and 
procreation, the right to procreate is “one of those moral rights that 
has been more assumed than argued for…where procreation is 
                                                                                                             
60Amnesty international, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/sexual-and-
reproductive-rights/ (“Sexual and reproductive rights mean you should be able 
to make your own decisions about your body and:….decide if you want to have 
children and how many”). 
61Center for Reproductive Rights, 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/RRa
reHR_final.pdf (listing among the twelve human rights key to reproductive 
rights “The Right to Decide the Number and Spacing of Children”). 
62One scholar has gone so far as to argue that children can never be harmed by 
being born, regardless of the brutality of the conditions in which they enter the 
world. See David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People 61 
(1992). 
63Laura M. Purdy, Children of Choice: Whose Children? At What Cost?, 52 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 197, 199–202 (1995). 
64Maura A. Ryan, The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist 
Critique, Hastings Center Rep., July-Aug. 1990, at 6. 
65Pearson, Yvette E. Storks, cabbage patches, and the right to procreate. 
JOURNAL OF BIOETHICAL INQUIRY Inquiry 4.2 (2007): 105-115, 109. 
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widely understood as being so fundamental to human existence— 
individually or as a species—that it does not require any argument 
in its defense.66 And linking the right to procreate so closely with 
the concept of the self and identity can be dangerous, as bioethicist 
Laura M. Purdy notes: 
[T[his model of the self encourages people to see the decision 
to have children primarily as a personal decision about themselves 
and not as a moral decision affecting others. This moral dimension 
of childbearing is obscured by the emphasis on self-creation, which 
makes it almost impossible to discuss, let alone construct, moral 
standards. Thus, it is hardly possible to talk about such matters as 
wrongful life or overpopulation without seeming to violate the 
individual’s most intimate self.67 
For the same reason that “the legal concept of privacy can and 
has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and women’s 
exploited labor,”68 absolute procreative freedom frequently protects 
the interests of those more powerful parties to the procreative 
equation.69 In this way, feminist theory regarding the operation of 
power dynamics practically begs for Fair Start orders as a means of 
protecting future children from abusive men and women, with 
children being the most vulnerable and “subordinated” group.70 
 
B. THE FEMINIST CASE FOR ISSUING FAIR START ORDERS 
SOLELY TO MEN 
 
The early versions of Fair Start orders targeted mostly women, 
both because, biologically speaking, it is easier to verify a female 
probationer’s compliance with the order, and because women are 
                                                                                                             
66Id at 106. 
67Purdy, supra note 63. 
68Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 
101 (1987); see also  Jean L. Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal 
Paradigm (2002) (noting the inadequacy of a privacy concept that merely 
ensures the right to be let alone, as it fails to protect the more vulnerable groups, 
and calling instead for a formulation of privacy as a “fundamental right to equal 
liberties”). 
69See. Ryan, supra note 64 (“From a feminist perspective, unlimited procreative 
liberty risks treating children as property, distorts understanding of the family, 
and neglects moral concerns about how we reproduce”). 
70See, e.g., Claire Houston, What Ever Happened to the “Child Maltreatment 
Revolution”?, 19 Geo. J. Gender & L. 1, 41 (2017) (positing that the feminist 
critique of family privacy would seem to highlight the role that the state’s family 
preservation efforts and noncriminal intervention play in children’s 
subordination and therefore maltreatment). 
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almost six times more likely than men to be custodial parents.71 As 
a result, there are simply many more opportunities for women to 
neglect their children than for men. 72  This disparity is then 
exacerbated by the fact that the justice system tends to hold mothers 
to a higher standard than fathers because of ingrained societal 
expectations that mothers should bear the responsibility for 
childrearing. 73 
And yet, despite spending substantially less time on average 
caring for children than women, men are nearly twice as likely to 
commit criminal acts of violence against their children.74 Worse yet, 
“male battering of women often escalates during pregnancy and 
causes more birth defects than all the diseases for which children are 
commonly inoculated. 75  As a matter of biology, men have the 
capacity to conceive more children than women, such that an 
abusive man could father several children during even a short 
probationary period. These distinctions between men and women 
could likely justify limiting Fair Start Orders to male probationers 
under intermediate scrutiny.76 
From a theoretical standpoint, one could also reasonably argue 
that only men truly enjoy absolute procreative rights in our 
patriarchal, pronatalist society, and therefore, that the case for 
placing some limitation on procreative rights is strongest as to men. 
That is, even if ostensibly free to choose whether to have children 
and in what amount, women still reside in a patriarchal system that 
favors reproduction over delayed childbearing and childlessness.77 
                                                                                                             
71Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of 
Criminalization, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 817, 819 (2000). 
72Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting 
Negligent Parents, (Wake Forest University School of Law Research Paper 
Series No. 05-08, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=673451. 
73Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, 
and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 584 
(1997) (“When fathers are involved in the proceedings, they are usually subject 
to lower expectations and are significantly less likely to be criminally charged 
with neglect or passive abuse of their children”). 
74See, e.g., Demie Kurz, Corporal Punishment and Adult Use of Violence: A 
Critique of “Discipline and Deviance”, 38 SOC. PROBS. 155, 159 (1991); 
Leslie Margolin, Beyond Maternal Blame: Physical Child Abuse as a 
Phenomenon of Gender, 13 J.Fam. Issues 410, 418-19 (1992). 
75Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective 
on Parents’ Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1766 (1993) (citing Nancy Gibbs, 
‘Til Death Us Do Part, TIME, at 38, 41 (Jan. 18, 1993). 
76Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976). 
77See Paddy McQueen. Autonomy, age and sterilisation requests. J. OF MED. 
ETHICS (2016). 
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Logically, the dangerous effects of patriarchy and power do not 
suddenly disappear with unlimited procreative rights, and it is no 
wonder then, that “those who do not wish to mother are often treated 
with disbelief or viewed as slightly pathological when they claim to 
want a ‘childfree’ life.” 78 
In truth, absolute procreative rights, as filtered through 
patriarchy, ends up promoting a woman’s choice only when it 
corresponds with a man’s preference: in this upside down, 
pronatalist framework, a 29 year old woman, for four years, was 
unable to find a doctor willing to sterilize her in accordance with her 
desire not to procreate (under the guise of protecting her from a 
decision she might later regret),79 whereas a child-bride receives 
IVF treatment at a major university hospital center (under the guise 
of “respecting the patient’s mentality and cultural norms”). 80 
Moreover, why are we more concerned that an adult who chooses to 
be sterilized might someday come to regret the decision81 (thereby 
affecting the welfare of zero children), than we are that a teenager 
who permanently creates another life might someday wish she had 
waited until she was fully mentally developed herself, particularly 
since children with older mothers—regardless of their parents’ 
background, education and finances—have fewer behavioral, social 
and emotional problems?82 
Given the nuanced arguments that may be raised on both sides, 
this Article leaves open the question of whether Fair Start orders 
                                                                                                             
78Kristin J. Wilson. Not trying: Reconceiving the motherhood mandate. Georgia 
State University, 2009; see also Laurie Lisle, Without Child: Challenging the 
Stigma of Childlessness 235 (1999) (observing that “[a]s long as a female is 
young and unmarried, her childlessness is unquestioned, even honored, since she 
represents the virgin archetype. When it is a matter of considered choice, 
however, the reaction is often different. The attractive lover of man, the 
Aphrodite or mistress type, is usually tolerated. But a nullipara who is old, 
isolated, or angry, or who is not sexual or maternal, runs the risk of being 
regarded as an anti-mother or an imperfect male and being cast out of the human 
family”). 
79Brockwell, Holly, The Guardian, “Why can’t I get sterilized in my 20s,” 
January 28, 2015. 
80Callaway, Ewen, New Scientist, “Interview: Why I gave a teenager IVF,” (May 
9, 2008), available at https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13867-interview-
why-i-gave-a-teenager-ivf/ (last visited March 19, 2019). 
81In fact, studies have shown that IVF can work after sterilisation. 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ivf-baby-possible-after-tubal-
sterilization/ (last visited March 19, 2019). 
82Tea Trillingsgaard, Dion Sommer. Associations between older maternal age, 
use of sanctions, and children’s socio-emotional development through 7, 11, and 
15 years. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2016; 1 DOI: 
10.1080/17405629.2016.1266248 
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should issue solely for men. Jurisdictions may reasonably decide 
one way or the other, so long as they do so with an awareness of the 
ways in which sexism and patriarchy will necessarily affect, and 
frankly, infect, the way in which procreative rights are exercised. 
 
V. THE MODEL FAIR START ORDER ACCORDS 
WITH THE HUMAN TO FOUND A FAMILY 
 
Under Article 23(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the Covenant recognizes “[t]he right of men and 
women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family.”  The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee notes that, “the right to 
found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate and 
live together.”83 Given that one has procreated after having a first 
child, the Committee interpretation should reasonably imply a 
limited right, such that the right to found a family does not include 
the right to have as many children as a person wishes (particularly 
after having neglected or abused previous children); the limiting of 
the right to found a family necessitated by the balancing of other 
human rights in the Covenant appear to support such an 
interpretation. 
As a preliminary matter, unlike other rights contained in the 
Covenant, the right to found a family can be derogated, see art. 4, 
and lacks the stipulation common to other rights that it not be 
unlawfully restricted. See e.g., art. 22 ¶¶ 1-2 (stipulating, in the 
context of “the right to freedom of association with others,” that 
“[n]o restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other 
than those which are prescribed by law”). The right to “found a 
family” under the Covenant is even further limited by competing 
rights and correlative duties as declared in article 5: “Nothing in the 
present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any 
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the present Covenant.”); see also Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 29, 30 (recognizing that rights 
must necessarily be limited by others’ rights and by the general 
welfare). 
                                                                                                             
83U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 19, art. 23 (Thirty-
ninth session 1990) in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 107, U.N. Doc. 
HR1/GEN/1/REV. 4 (2000). 
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Chief among these competing rights in the Covenant is article 
24(1), which entitles every child “to such measures of protection as 
are required by his status as a minor on the part of his family, society 
and the State.” As the Committee notes in its General Comment on 
Article 6, these “special measures of protection…should be guided 
by the best interests of the child, by the need to ensure the survival 
and development of all children, and their well-being.” The 
Committee also recognizes in its General Comment that the right to 
life for children and adults alike “depends on measures taken by 
States parties to protect the environment against harm and 
pollution.”84 
Since the right “to found a family” must be interpreted so as 
not to abrogate competing rights, it must therefore be balanced 
against the prospective child’s right to life. Human rights are all 
constructed and limited in order to improve human wellbeing, not 
diminish it, which is why the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights specifically recognizes that one person’s rights may be 
limited by others’ competing rights and/or in the interest of the 
general welfare. 
                                                                                                             
84In contrast to ICCPR Article 23(2)’s vague and arguably satiable right “to 
found a family,” 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo
men (“CEDAW”)requires signatories to ensure that men and women have “[t]he 
same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their 
children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable 
them to exercise these rights.”159 However, the modifier “responsibly” 
necessarily demonstrates that any such right is not unlimited. See also 
Dillard, Prospective Parents and the Children’s Rights Convention, 25 Am. U. 
Int’l L. Rev. 485, 523 (2010) (arguing that “CEDAW does not create any new 
rights, but rather seeks to bolster rights already provided by the UDHR, ICCPR, 
and ICESCR.Put more simply, CEDAW should not be interpreted as creating a 
broader right to procreate for women than that enjoyed by men, but should 
instead be read as establishing parity between the two genders.”). In other 
words, CEDAW itself recognizes that absolute procreative freedom does not 
exist in a vacuum, but it fails to meaningfully address the problem. 
As for nonbinding sources of international law, they, too, appear to implicate a 
broader procreative right than “founding a family,” but these nonbinding sources 
also qualify a parent’s right to have as many children as she wishes by 
specifying the manner in which that right should be exercised. See United 
Nations: Report of the International Conference on Population and 
Development, UN Doc No A/CONF.171/13, Cairo, Egypt, 5–13 September 
1994 (18 Oct 1994) (“In the exercise of this right, they should take into account 
the needs of their living and future children and their responsibilities toward the 
community.”); see also Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International 
Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 (1968)(“ Parents have a basic human right to determine 
freely and responsibly the number and spacing of  their children…”) (emphasis 
added). 
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In this way, the Model Fair Start order is best understood as a 
balancing mechanism that best protects all human rights, as opposed 
to some brazen attack on procreative rights. And balancing is sorely 
needed, with one commentator going so far as to subordinate a 
child’s interest in avoiding neglect and abuse to the ticking 
biological clocks of older child abusers, 85  and others, while 
acknowledging the high recidivism rates among perpetrators of 
child abuse and neglect, insisting that because recidivism is less than 
100%, the true danger lies in the possibility that the probationer 
would erroneously be deprived of the right to procreate during the 
rehabilitative period (contemplating that or she may have turned out 
to be within the minority of offenders that would not have abused or 
neglected the additional child).86 
 
VI. FAIR START ORDERS AS A STEPPING STONE 
TO A LEGITIMATE HUMAN RIGHTS BASED FAMILY 
PLANNING MODEL 
 
In the United States, the patriarchal preference for women as 
reproductive vessels is reflected in specific pronatalist policies, 
particularly of late, among them defunding teen pregnancy 
programs, severely limiting family planning abroad, and rolling 
back the ACA birth control mandate, which disproportionately 
harms poor women and women of color.87 Within this pronatalist 
framework, absolute procreative rights may easily be transformed 
into tools that actually hurt those most vulnerable by restricting 
                                                                                                             
85See Joanna Nairn, Is There A Right to Have Children? Substantive Due 
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women to traditional gender roles,88 exacerbating income inequality 
with a glut of cheap laborers,89 and depriving future generations of 
children a fair start in life. 
Fortunately, despite the predominance of the pronatalist family 
planning framework, there is a growing recognition of a need for 
policies that focus on delayed childbearing, and smaller families in 
particular, both as investments in the environment,90 investments in 
the economy,91 and investments in children.92 And since it is in the 
context of serious child abuse and neglect cases that the horrific 
consequences of pronatalism become most stark, it is in this context 
that widespread norm change is most likely. 
Of course, such a foundational change in the way we plan 
families will require a multipronged approached. Thus, advocacy for 
Fair Start orders should be accompanied by calls – including by 
courts – for specific legislation, funding, and resource reallocations 
that address the underlying problem in family planning: The need to 
eliminate inequality in a way that moves towards giving every child 
a fair start in life, with opportunities equal to the opportunities 
enjoyed by other children in their generation. This could include, for 
example, a guaranteed minimum income for children 93  and the 
establishment of trust fund for each child born to low-income 
parents, as well as increased investments in more progressive family 
planning measures such as long-acting reversible contraception 
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(LARC) pilot programs,94 and male contraception (the progression 
of which has been delayed in no small part by sexism95). 
While only a preliminary step, the implementation of the 
Model Fair Start Order would begin to shift the family planning 
paradigm to one that better protects a child’s right to a fair start in 
life, transforming vicious cycles into virtuous ones: after all, the 
child who receives a fair start in life is necessarily better equipped 
to provide her potential future child with a fair start someday. 
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